EXHIBIT 7

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1
       IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
        FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
3
                EASTERN DIVISION
4
5
                            : HON. DAN A.
     IN RE: NATIONAL
     PRESCRIPTION OPIATE : POLSTER
     LITIGATION
7
     APPLIES TO ALL CASES : NO.
8
                             : 1:17-MD-2804
9
            - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL -
10
    SUBJECT TO FURTHER CONFIDENTIALITY REVIEW
11
                    VOLUME I
12
13
                 April 17, 2019
14
15
                 Videotaped deposition of
16
    THOMAS PREVOZNIK, taken pursuant to
    notice, was held at the law offices of
17
    Williams & Connolly, 725 12th Street,
18
    Washington, D.C., beginning at 9:11 a.m.,
    on the above date, before Michelle L.
    Gray, a Registered Professional Reporter,
19
    Certified Shorthand Reporter, Certified
    Realtime Reporter, and Notary Public.
20
21
22
           GOLKOW LITIGATION SERVICES
       877.370.3377 ph | 917.591.5672 fax
23
                 deps@golkow.com
24
```

```
1
           order in which the recipient of
2
           the order detects through their
3
           suspicious order monitoring
4
           system, a reason or reasons that
           may indicate that that order may
5
6
           be -- that order may be diverted
7
           outside the legitimate scientific,
8
           medical, and industry channels.
9
           That's what it is.
10
                  So the subjectivity would be
11
           not just us looking at it.
12
           mean, we would look at it. They
13
           would look at it. And that's why
14
           many have gotten in trouble,
15
           because they didn't look at it and
16
           changed stuff. So, you know, when
17
           we get -- if we go to court or
18
           whatever, it's going to be up to
19
           the jury and the judge to decide.
20
    BY MS. MAINIGI:
21
                 Because it's subjective,
           Q.
22
    right?
23
                 MR. FINKELSTEIN: Objection.
24
           Vague.
```

```
1
                 THE WITNESS: Yeah, it can
2
           be subjective.
3
                 MS. MAINIGI: Let's take a
4
           break.
5
                 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: All
6
           parties agree to go off the
7
           record?
8
                 MR. FINKELSTEIN: Yes.
9
           Thank you.
10
                 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Thank
11
           you. 12:24, we are off the video
12
           record.
13
14
                   (Lunch break.)
15
16
          AFTERNOON SESSION
17
18
                 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: 1:32, we
19
           are on the video record.
20
    BY MS. MAINIGI:
21
           Q. Good afternoon. Let me hand
22
    you Exhibit 6 to take a look at.
23
                 (Document marked for
24
           identification as Exhibit
```

- 1 it the CSA. The CSA does not require
- distributors to report the suspicious
- orders of other distributors, does it?
- A. Correct.
- ⁵ Q. And the CSA does not require
- 6 distributors to share information with
- ⁷ each other about suspicious orders,
- 8 correct?
- 9 A. Correct.
- 10 Q. Now, similarly, the
- 11 regulations do not require distributors
- to report suspicious orders of other
- distributors, correct?
- 14 A. Correct.
- Q. And the regulations do not
- 16 require distributors to communicate with
- each other about suspicious orders,
- 18 correct?
- A. Correct.
- Q. In fact, the regulations
- only apply to the suspicious orders that
- 22 a distributor receives from its own
- 23 customers, correct?
- A. You lost me on the

- at a number and say that's too big.
 - MR. O'CONNOR: Whoever is on
- the phone needs to go on mute.
- 4 MR. FINKELSTEIN: Whoever is
- on the phone please mute your
- 6 phone.
- ⁷ BY MR. O'CONNOR:
- Q. Before we get back to my
- ⁹ question, I just want to be clear.
- 10 Are -- are vets required to obtain a DEA
- 11 registration before they order controlled
- 12 substances?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 0. And the DEA issues some
- ¹⁵ veterinarians registrations to allow them
- to purchase controlled substances?
- A. Correct.
- Q. Okay. I do -- I do want to
- 19 get back to my original question though,
- which was, is an order that is unusually
- large, does that order necessarily lead
- 22 to diversion?
- MR. FINKELSTEIN: Objection.
- Vague.

```
1
                 THE WITNESS: It may or
2
           may -- it may or may not.
    BY MR. O'CONNOR:
4
                 Would the same be true of an
           0.
5
    unusually frequent order?
6
                 MR. FINKELSTEIN: Same
7
           objection. You can answer.
8
                 THE WITNESS: Correct. It
9
           may or may not.
10
    BY MR. O'CONNOR:
11
           O. And the same would be true
12
    of an order that deviates substantially
13
    from the normal pattern?
14
                 MR. FINKELSTEIN: Same
15
           objection. You can answer.
16
                 THE WITNESS: Correct. It
17
           may or may not.
18
    BY MR. O'CONNOR:
19
             Okay. And putting that
           Ο.
20
    together, that means that not every
21
    suspicious order leads to diversion,
22
    correct?
23
                 MR. FINKELSTEIN: Objection.
24
           Scope. You can answer.
```

- Q. But to my question, has the
- ² DEA ever provided any kind of guidance to
- manufacturers informing them that they
- were to know their customers' customer?
- A. No, not to my knowledge.
- Q. Okay. Let's talk for a
- ⁷ minute about ARCOS.
- 8 Generally speaking, what
- 9 sorts of information does ARCOS contain?
- 10 A. ARCOS contains the
- 11 manufacturers and distributors that are
- 12 to report all transactions for
- 13 Schedule I, Schedule II, Schedule III
- 14 narcotics, and GHB, and manufacturers
- 15 also have reported -- additional
- 16 reporting requirements for some
- psychotropics.
- Q. Okay. Would ARCOS contain
- 19 all of the distributions of prescription
- opioids by manufacturers to distributors?
- A. So the transactions for
- manufacture -- yes, manufacturer to a
- ²³ distributor? Yes.
- Q. Would ARCOS contain all the

- distributions of prescription opioids
- ² from distributors to pharmacies or other
- ³ retail outlets?
- A. For those items, yes.
- ⁵ Q. Does ARCOS data provide any
- 6 details about those transactions, like
- ⁷ the amount, the recipients --
- A. Yes, it tracks the quantity.
- 9 It has the DEA number of the registrant
- that -- whether it's a sale. It could be
- a sale, it could be a purchase. It could
- be a disposition of, you know, getting
- wasted. Any transaction that -- that
- 14 could fall within the system that --
- that's trackable, that would be in there,
- 16 for those items.
- Q. Okay. Through ARCOS, can
- 18 DEA see the type of medication that's
- 19 being purchased?
- A. Well, it's in there by NDC
- 21 number.
- Q. Okay. And the NDC number
- would -- would allow the DEA to determine
- which product we are talking about?

- A. Correct.
- 0. So whether that was a -- the
- 3 DEA would know whether it was a oxycodone
- ⁴ 5-milligram tablet, for example?
- A. Correct.
- 6 O. That level of detail?
- ⁷ A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And the DEA receives
- ⁹ that information for each tablet that the
- manufacturers sell to distributors,
- 11 correct?
- A. Each tablet?
- 0. Yes.
- 14 A. It's by bottle size, because
- 15 NDC code also has the bottle size within
- ¹⁶ it.
- Q. Got it. So -- so the DEA
- can see each and every bottle that's
- shipped between a manufacturer and a
- ²⁰ distributor?
- A. As long as that's what they
- ²² are reporting, yes.
- Q. Okay. And through ARCOS,
- DEA can also see each and every bottle of

- ¹ opioids that's transmitted from a
- 2 manufacturer -- I'm sorry. Strike that.
- And through ARCOS, DEA can
- 4 see each and every bottle of opioids
- 5 that's transferred from a distributor to
- 6 a pharmacy for example, correct?
- A. Correct.
- Q. And they'll know the
- 9 location of that pharmacy?
- A. Correct.
- 11 Q. Do they have the address for
- 12 the pharmacy?
- A. Yes. It's linked to the DEA
- 14 registration.
- Q. Okay. So through ARCOS, the
- 16 DEA has precise information about how
- much of certain products is being shipped
- to which geographic areas, correct?
- A. Correct.
- 20 Could I get a clarification
- on what time frame you're talking about?
- Q. Sure. So I would say 1996
- to the present. Does the answer change
- 24 at all during that time period?

- 1 to my instruction too.
- O. Understood.
- 3 Has DEA identified sources
- 4 of diversion based on information DEA has
- ⁵ received in suspicious order reports?
- 6 A. Yes.
- ⁷ Q. Okay. When DEA identifies a
- 8 source of diversion via information in a
- 9 suspicious order report, does DEA want to
- stop the supply of opioids to that source
- 11 of diversion?
- 12 A. Yes.
- Q. And does DEA want to stop
- the supply of opioids to that source of
- diversion as soon as DEA learns the
- identity of the suspected diverter?
- MR. FINKELSTEIN: Vague.
- THE WITNESS: Yes.
- 19 BY MR. STEPHENS:
- Q. All right. Between 2007 and
- 21 2018, DEA received over 1.2 million
- 22 electronic suspicious order reports from
- ²³ registrants.
- A. Is that a -- it sounds like

- 1 it was a statement. I'm sorry.
- Q. It's a question. Is that
- ³ true?
- 4 A. Could you -- could you
- ⁵ repeat the question.
- Q. Sure.
- Between 2007 and 2018 DEA
- 8 received over 1.2 million electronic
- 9 suspicious order reports from
- 10 registrants, true?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. Let me -- if I could point
- you back to Exhibit 17, which is the
- 14 transcript from March -- or the senate
- congressional record from March 20, 2018.
- Do you have that in front of
- ¹⁷ you?
- ¹⁸ A. Yes.
- 19 Q. I direct you to Page 93,
- ²⁰ Mr. Prevoznik.
- 21 A. Okay.
- Q. And this is a Q&A, written
- Q&A between Congress and DEA, right?
- A. That's what it looks like.

- 1 analyzes those SORs -- analyzed SORs
- ² between 2006 and 2015.
- Is it fair to say that DEA's
- 4 current leadership has been working hard
- 5 to improve how DEA reviews suspicious
- ⁶ order reports?
- ⁷ A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Between 2006 and 2015 under
- 9 Mr. Rannazzisi's leadership, did DEA have
- a published policy that ensured that
- someone at DEA would investigate every
- 12 suspicious order report that DEA
- 13 received?
- MS. SINGER: Objection.
- Lack of foundation.
- THE WITNESS: Not that I'm
- aware of.
- 18 BY MR. STEPHENS:
- Q. Okay. Was there any policy
- 20 at DEA that would have prevented
- Mr. Rannazzisi, who ran the diversion
- control group, from instituting a
- practice or policy that ensured that
- someone from DEA would investigate every

```
1
           to show cause, and perhaps they
2
           got suspended. There was some
3
           administrative action because they
4
           did not report them.
5
    BY MR. STEPHENS:
6
                 All right. But my point,
           0.
7
    Mr. Prevoznik, is simply that the 254
8
    immediate suspension orders that are
9
    listed here between 2007 and 2017, not
10
    every one of them was the result of DEA
11
    following up on a suspicious order report
12
    that had been sent to DEA; is that fair?
13
                 MR. FINKELSTEIN: Are you
14
           representing to the witness that
15
           these numbers add up to 254?
16
                 MR. STEPHENS: Yes.
17
    BY MR. STEPHENS:
18
                 I will represent to you that
19
    for the immediate suspension orders, the
    totals from 2007 to 2017, is 254. I will
20
21
    represent to you that the order to show
22
    cause filed from 2007 to 2017 is 638.
23
    And I'll also represent to you that the
    total column from 2007 to 2017 is 9,851.
24
```

```
1
    Okay?
2
                 Okay.
           Α.
3
                 MR. FINKELSTEIN: Counsel is
4
           telling you that.
5
                 THE WITNESS: Okay.
6
                 MR. FINKELSTEIN: We haven't
7
           checked his math.
8
                 MR. STEPHENS: You're
9
           welcome to do so.
10
    BY MR. STEPHENS:
11
           Q. So my question,
12
    Mr. Prevoznik, was, would you agree with
13
    me that the 254 suspension orders that
14
    are listed here from 2007 to 2017, not
15
    every one of them was generated as the
16
    result of DEA following up on an
17
    investigation of a SOR report the DEA had
18
    received; is that fair?
19
                 MR. FINKELSTEIN: Asked and
20
           answered.
21
                 THE WITNESS: Yes.
22
    BY MR. STEPHENS:
23
           Q. Okay. For today's purposes,
24
    let's assume that every one of these 254
```

- was generated by the -- were all the
- ² result of DEA receiving and investigating
- ³ a suspicious order report. All right.
- ⁴ I'll give you the benefit of that, okay?
- A. Okay.
- Q. If you take 254 against the
- one point -- against the 1,204,400 SORs
- 8 reports the DEA received, that would
- 9 equate to something along the lines of
- 10 2/100 of 1 percent. Do you agree with
- 11 that?
- 12 A. I didn't do the math, but
- 13 I'll go with -- I'll go with you.
- Q. Okay. So would you agree
- the DEA would have obtained less than
- 16 1 percent of immediate suspension orders
- off the 1.2 million suspicious order
- 18 reports that DEA received?
- MR. FARRELL: Objection.
- Foundation. And I think you just
- bait and switched here a little
- ²² bit.
- MR. STEPHENS: I didn't mean
- to. So let me check my question.

```
1
    BY MR. STEPHENS:
2
                  So my question is this:
           Ο.
3
    Assuming that all 254 of the immediate
4
    suspension orders that DEA received from
5
    2007 to 2017 were based off of suspicious
6
    order reports, and DEA received
7
    1.2 million suspicious order reports, you
8
    would agree with me that the percentage
9
    of suspicious order reports that DEA
10
    converted into immediate suspension
11
    orders was less than 1 percent?
12
                  MR. FINKELSTEIN:
13
           Foundation. Misstates prior
14
           testimony.
15
                  THE WITNESS: Well, I mean,
16
           I think that's a unique way to
17
           look at it. You can also do the
18
           flip side and say how many weren't
           reported that we had cases on.
19
20
           And to just limit it to the ISOs
21
           doesn't take you to putting people
22
           in compliance, whether through
23
           letters of admonition or MOAs that
24
           we've come to with companies
```

```
1
            regarding that.
2
                  I mean, it's a hypothetical.
3
    BY MR. STEPHENS:
                  Between 2007 and 2017, the
4
            0.
5
    percentage of suspicious order reports
6
    the DEA received and converted into
7
    immediate suspension orders is less than
8
    1 percent, true?
9
                  Yes. In your hypothetical,
            Α.
10
    true.
11
                  All right. So between 2007
            0.
12
    and 2017, the percentage of suspicious
13
    order reports that DEA converted into
14
    orders to show cause, the 638 here,
15
    that's also less than 1 percent. It is
16
    .005 \text{ or } 5/100 \text{ of } 1 \text{ percent?}
17
                  MR. FARRELL: Objection.
18
            Foundation.
19
                  MR. FINKELSTEIN:
20
            Foundation. Misstates prior
21
            testimony.
22
                  THE WITNESS: It's a
23
            hypothetical. I'll go with you.
24
```

- 1 BY MR. STEPHENS:
- Q. Okay. Between 2007 and
- ³ 2017, if you include everything in the
- 4 table, orders to show cause, immediate
- ⁵ suspension orders filed, voluntary
- surrenders, the 9,851 totaled from 2007
- ⁷ and 2017, the percentage of those against
- 8 the 1.2 million of suspicious order
- 9 reports would result in a conversion rate
- of less than 1 percent?
- MR. FARRELL: Objection.
- Fuzzy math.
- MR. FINKELSTEIN: Which rule
- is that?
- Foundation. Misstates prior
- testimony.
- You can answer if you
- understand.
- 19 BY MR. STEPHENS:
- Q. Let me ask you a more
- 21 precise question.
- A. All right.
- Q. Okay. What I want you to
- do, is I'm going to ask about the 9,851,

- the full total, okay. Are you with me?
- A. I'm with you.
- Q. Okay. So between 2007 and
- 4 2017, if you include the voluntary
- ⁵ surrenders, immediate suspension orders,
- the order to show causes, the percentage
- of suspicious order reports that DEA
- 8 converted of the suspicious order reports
- 9 is less than 1 percent?
- MR. FINKELSTEIN:
- Foundation. Misstates prior
- testimony.
- THE WITNESS: In your
- hypothetical situation, yes.
- 15 BY MR. STEPHENS:
- 0. Okay. Do you know what
- percentage of suspicious order reports
- 18 DEA converted into criminal indictments
- ¹⁹ between 2007 and 2017?
- MR. FINKELSTEIN: Vague.
- THE WITNESS: I do not.
- 22 BY MR. STEPHENS:
- Q. Do you know -- okay. So
- 24 between 2007 and 2017, would you know